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 DOLILU II is a ground control system that generates space shuttle’s launch 
trajectories, first stage guidance commands and verifies whether the generated 
trajectories are safe for the flight. It is a safety critical system and a high degree of 
confidence in its safety and reliability must be gained through assessment. We addressed 
three issues related to its safety and reliability assessment. We developed a reliability 
assessment framework for DOLILU II system. We proposed techniques to speed up test 
case execution and designed methodologies for the generation of input conditions needed 
to test the system. 
 We used a Bayesian statistical framework for reliability assessment. Bayesian 
statistics uses knowledge about the system to be incorporated into the reliability model 
before testing. DOLILU II has been operational for nearly five years. We use this 
information when developing the reliability model. This information is introduced in the 
form of prior beliefs. 
 DOLILU II system requires an average time of 30 minutes for each test run. This 
translates into a large time period required for testing to demonstrate that DOLILU II 
exhibits the required failure rate. Vertical slicing, a semantic transformation technique, is 
used to prove the possibility of parallel execution and enhance each test case execution. 
 DOLILU II is an on-demand system. Many test trajectories are needed for its 
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From Blaise Pascal’s modest invention of the first adding machine, to present day 
fast computing machines; computers have undergone a significant metamorphosis. 
Starting with the big bulky computers (UNIVAC, ENIAC) that cost over a million 
dollars to fast desktop machines available today, they have progressed slowly from 
solving problems of the scientific community, to permeate all occupations. 
With computers becoming increasingly indispensable, there exists growing 
awareness about the  “untrustworthiness” of one of man’s greatest inventions. Though 
computer systems firmware consists of both hardware and software, there has been more 
emphasis on how much one’s reliance on software can be trusted. There are several 
factors that abet this cause. The chief one that plagues software engineering unlike other 
major engineering disciplines, including even computer hardware, is that they have a 
more disciplined approach to both designing and addressing problems that persist in their 
fields. There is generally a predictable life span for a given hardware product. It can be 
modeled as a decaying rate of efficiency at which the product will deliver service. 
Software, on the other hand, cannot be attributed with any of these factors. Most 
disciplines are characterized by having a strong mathematical backbone they can rely on, 
a simplistic design process and a more gradual change attaching more reliability to the 
products thus evolved. 
Design of software based systems is characterized by inherent “complexity” of 
software involved. Idiosyncratic nature of software have been exhibited by one and all  
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computer systems. Despite several fallacies, there is still a widespread acceptance of 
software. The tolerance towards software failures is inversely proportional to the cost a 
person is willing to pay for the software.  
Failures in certain systems, however, are unacceptable. We may classify them into 
two categories 
•  Money critical systems: systems that fall into this category are transaction 
processing like banking software, telecommunications like networking systems 
deployed for stock exchanges. Erroneous data processing could lead to 
bankruptcy of a firm! 
•  Safety Critical Systems: software systems controlling/monitoring process control 
systems like nuclear power plants, chemical plants, satellite software, flight 
control. These systems are characterized by an enormous capital investment in 
creating them and a failure that could endanger human life. In this thesis, we 
deal with systems belonging to this category. 
1.2 Software Usage And Experiences 
 
Bev Littlewood and Lorenzo Stringini expressed their views regarding the 
deployment of software in “systems where software is critical for safety”. In their 
article[3], they delineated their growing concern, emphasizing the shortfall to guarantee 
software correctness. They state “an appropriate level of safety can only be granted if the 
applicability of software manning critical process is limited”. Despite several problems 
that cripple software, it is still been used in several areas inclusive of process control 
environments. The main advantage is that it allows a great degree of flexibility when 
subsequent changes needs to be done to the system. Furthermore, automation of 
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equipment in environments like nuclear power plants decrease the risk of the human user 
controlling the process from exposure to hazardous radiation.  
There is an adage that goes “one learns from one’s own experiences”. The best 
way to know how software behaves when actually put to use is gathered only from field 
experiences [3]. To attest to this fact, we may quote several examples where, software 
failure has not only wasted enormous capital investment but also endangered and killed 
human life. The following subsections relate these very instances. 
1.2.1 Ariane 5 
The maiden flight of Ariane5 (European Space Agency), launcher ended in a 
failure on 4 June 1996. The launcher veered off its intended flight course, broke up and 
exploded. The board documented the proceedings of the investigation [4]. The Flight 
Control Systems on Ariane5 measured the altitude movements of the spacecraft in space 
by an Inertial Reference System (SRI).  The data from the SRI was conveyed through a 
databus to the On-board Computer (OBC). The OBC executes the flight program and 
controls the nozzles of the solid boosters and cryogenic engine through hydraulic 
actuators and servovalves. In order to improve reliability, there were two SRI's operating 
in parallel with identical hardware and software. The design of Ariane5 SRI was 
practically the same as on its predecessor and hence the software was reused.  
After about 40 seconds into flight, due to an angle of attack of more than 20 
degrees high aerodynamic loads were caused. This in turn led to the separation of the 
boosters from the main stage, triggering the self-destruct system.  
The angle of attack was caused by full nozzle deflections of the solid boosters and 
Vulcain main engine. This was commanded by the OBC on data that was received from 
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the SRI system. This was because of a bit pattern from SRI 2 that was misconstrued to be 
the flight data.  
An internal software exception was generated on SRI 1 when a data conversion 
from a 64-bit floating point to a 16-bit integer was made. SRI 1 shut down transferring 
control to SRI 2. SRI 2 also detected the same fault but could not switch back to the SRI 
1. SRI 2 hence conveyed incorrect flight data to OBC. The error occurred in the part of 
the software that only performs alignment strap-down inertial platform. This software 
provides meaningful information only before the lift off. This function was, by mistake, 
operational for 40 seconds into flight. This time sequence was a requirement in Ariane4 
but not in Ariane5. The operand error resulted in a high value of Horizontal Bias (BH), 
related to horizontal velocity. The value of BH was higher than expected for Ariane5 as 
the early part of the trajectory was different from Ariane4. This cascade led to the 
destruction of the launcher. 
1.2.2 Mars Climate Orbiter 
On December 11, 1998, NASA launched the Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) with 
the objective to observe the planets surface, profile the structure of the atmosphere, and 
detect surface reservoirs. This was a part of the Mars Surveyor Program started in 
1993.[5] 
 Nine and half months into the flight, on September 1999, MCO was to fire its 
main engine to achieve an elliptical orbit around mars. A technique called 
“aerobreaking” was being used to maneuver the flight through Mars’ upper atmosphere, 
to reduce velocity and move into circular orbit. On September 23 1999, MCO mission 
was lost when it entered the atmosphere on lower trajectory than expected.  
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 The board investigated the mishap and proposed the following reasons for the 
failure. On September 8 1999, the interplanetary Trajectory Correction Maneuver-4 
(TCM-4) was planned. This maneuver was expected to adjust the trajectory such that 
after the orbital insertion burn the point closest to the planet would be at a distance of 226 
km. The data was up-linked to the orbiter in metadata files (AMD files). The on-board 
computer computed the orbital insertion distance. TCM-4 was executed as planned on 
September 15, 1999. Mars orbit insertion (MOI) was planned for September 23. During 
this period, orbit determination processing by the navigation team received data 
indicating that the first periapse distance had decreased to the range of 150-170km. 24 
hours before MOI, MCO began to feel strong effects of Mars’ gravitational field. Before 
one hour of MOI, first periapse altitude was 110 km. 
 The MOI was started and all systems performed nominally until Mars’ occultation 
loss of signal. Signal was to be reacquired after the 21-minute interval predicted for the 
occultation period. There was no retrieval.  
 On September 27, 1999, the operations navigation team discussed navigation 
discrepancies regarding velocity change modeling issues. After two days it was found 
that the small forces, ∆V’s, used in orbit determination on the orbiter before the 
initialization burn (MOI) was low by a factor of 4.45 (1 pound force = 4.45 Newton). The 
impulse bit data contained in the AMD file was delivered in lb.-sec instead of expected 
units Newton-sec. 
 After navigation estimates, using available data through loss of signal, with 
corrected values the initial periapsis of 57 km was calculated which was too low for the 
spacecraft survival. The estimated minimum altitude for survival was 80km. 
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1.3 Motivation 
 
 Safety in today’s technological terms seems akin to the notion of  “risk”. R.N. 
Charette [9] defined risk as an action/event having the following characteristics 
•  Having a loss associated with it 
•  Where uncertainty or chance is involved 
•  Some choice is also involved 
Safety based on the above observations may be phrased as “ freedom from exposure to 
danger, or the exemption from hurt or loss” [11]. 
 Several safety-critical systems follow this description. These systems require a 
very high degree of confidence in their functioning. With so much at stake, a rigorous 
framework of development is deemed essential when dealing with such high consequence 
systems. Assurance of specifications was the first step taken to ensure the correctness of 
requirements for the system. Languages like Z [20] have been successfully used to 
formally specify the requirements thereby minimizing design errors that might creep in 
due to an incorrect requirement definition document. Furthermore, to achieve greater 
reliability by masking faults introduced at the design phase of the project, design diversity 
[26] was adopted leading to fault tolerant and fault preventive systems [6]. Consequently, 
these systems seldom exhibit failures. The question now arises, are all the above factors 
sufficient to attest that the software will function without failures? When such a high 
degree of dependability is a requirement, when subversion of the system could cause a 
loss of life, it becomes apparent that one needs to endorse that the system indeed satisfies 
the reliability requirement.  
. 
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Our work involved in developing assessment methods for NASA’s Day of 
Launch I-Load Update (DOLILU II) system. The system evaluates trajectory parameters 
against the I-Loads (Initialization Loads) that dictate the guidance commands for the 
space shuttle. Wrongly approved trajectories and guidance commands could lead to the 
destruction of the space shuttle. This system was a high consequence system.  
Rigorous development methodologies were adopted to develop the system. 
During each phase in the software life cycle, stringent and scrupulous techniques were 
followed to ensure proper design and development (the requirements and design phase 
went through 8 levels before final approval). During the verification and validation phase, 
however, methodologies only stress tested the system with no effort to quantify the 
reliability of the system. Furthermore, the system has been operational for the past 5 
years. This gave us an opportunity to analyze the system and also develop a framework to 
assess its reliability. 
We looked into several theories that have been proposed over the years on 
estimating the reliability of software in safety critical systems. They could be classified 
into three main categories  
•  Formal methods 
•  Exhaustive testing 
•  Statistical testing 
Formal methods have their genesis in years of mathematical formulation. The 
underlying paradigm is that a program meets the “correctness” requirement if it satisfies 
its intended purpose. In other words, it is said to be functionally correct if it behaves 
according to the specifications. Program correctness is an absolute measure; the program 
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under verification is either valid or invalid. There is no quantification of reliability; it is 
either zero or one. 
The drawback with this method is the assumption that the specifications 
themselves are correct in nature. A correct implementation of a specification may still 
lead to unreliable execution of program due to an imperfect specification [10] . It’s 
tedious to provide proofs for complex systems. Hence it was difficult to formally verify 
the entire DOLILU II system. 
The more traditional way to estimate reliability of software is testing. Huang et al. 
[12] stated in his paper that exhaustive testing is impossible as it is difficult to cover the 
entire input domain for complex systems, to ensure complete execution of all paths in a 
program. With a complex system like DOLILU II, this methodology was ruled out. 
In this thesis we lay emphasis on the third form of software assessment based on 
statistical testing techniques. These models perform repeated executions of software to 
provide a certain level of confidence that the required degree of reliability has been 
successfully achieved.  
There were several challenges that we were posed with applying statistical 
methods to DOLILU II system. 
 Our discussions with the NASA IV&V personnel revealed that DOLILU system 
required a demonstration of probability of failure less than 10-5. With a statistical 
assessment framework this would translate into a large number of test cases. 
However, we had information regarding the development process, the testing that had 
already been done and the fact that the system has been in operational use for several 
years. We needed an assessment framework, which would incorporate this 
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information into our assessment model to determine an acceptable time frame to 
assess the system. 
 After developing a framework for assessment, we now needed to have sufficient 
inputs generated to test the system.  
 As the execution time for DOLILU II was in the order of minutes, we needed to 
decrease the time required for each test case execution 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
 
The remaining thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 overviews existing 
reliability assessment techniques. Chapter 3 analyzes the different systems that comprise 
the DOLILU II system. Emphasis is laid on DIVDT (Day of launch I-Load Verification 
Table). This chapter also enumerates the different techniques that have been used to 
evaluate the working of DIVIDT, inclusive of test plans and their executions. 
Chapter 4 introduces the notion of reliability as applicable to software. A 
comparison is made between classical sampling theory and Bayesian inference, 
delineating the merits of the Bayesian approach and its implications on assessing 
ultrahigh reliability for software based systems. 
Chapter 5 describes the use of slicing techniques to split the system into subparts, 
and demonstrate the accelerated test case execution of the DIVIDT subsystem.  
Chapter 6 address issues for auto generation of test cases. Here we explore 
regression methodologies that could be adopted for generation of input conditions. It also 
addresses issues regarding oracles. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis and suggests further work and other approaches 
for evaluating the system. 
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2.0 Chapter 2: Related Work 
 
Historically, software creation has been viewed as a two-stage process. The first is 
the translation of requirements from informal description into formal specifications. 
Second is the translation of specifications into executable code. 
When viewing this two-tier hierarchy one realizes that, there are at least two 
processes where faults can be introduced. The main problem with achieving such high 
reliability is the probability that subtle design faults always exist [13]. Design faults arise 
due to incorrect understanding of requirements or due to omission in the specification 
stage. Implementation faults occur during the second phase due to insufficient testing, 
verification and validation. 
This leads to three schools of thought for ensuring the reliability of critical 
software. One way is verifying the correctness of specifications, indicating that all 
desirable properties were captured. The second group aims at masking the effect of faults. 
Techniques belonging to this category are fault tolerance and fault prevention. The third 
group of methods, applicable at the tail end of software life cycle, includes assessment 
techniques that instill the confidence that the requirements of reliability are met [6]. 
The remaining part of this chapter illustrates reliability assessment techniques, 
mainly statistical reliability assessment methods. 
2.1 Reliability Assessment Methods 
 
Techniques, like assurance of specifications, vouch for the correctness of the 
specifications. They reflect that all the properties were captured.  It improves the removal 
of faults introduced during the requirement specification stage. Nevertheless, the question 
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remains does it truly reflect the reliability of the system. One cannot assure that the 
implementation and design were devoid of faults. One might however reduce any 
ambiguity in understanding the specifications. 
Fault Tolerant and Fault Preventive systems attempt at nullifying subtle design 
errors that might encroach. They adopt design diversity, to decrease the faults in the 
system. Fault tolerant systems appeals to the robustness of software. These types of 
systems increase the reliability by making the software execute in an acceptable manner 
for spurious inputs. This is achieved by having different versions of the software. Fault 
Prevention strives to achieve the same by making comparisons of different designs and 
then taking the union of them. These systems enhance the reliability, but they do not 
provide any information that justifies the reliability level they claim to have achieved 
There are two approaches to assess the reliability of software: 
•  Static Assessment Analysis. 
•  Dynamic Assessment Analysis. 
Static analysis requires no execution of the program that is being analyzed. 
Program verification uses mathematical logic to prove program correctness. It proves 
beyond the element of doubt that the program functions as specified under all possible 
input conditions, implying all execution conditions. 
Dynamic assessment analysis adheres to the more conventional technique of 
executing the program to check for conformance with specifications. The program 
undergoing evaluation is subjected to different inputs. The outputs of the program are 
then compared with the expected results for the tested inputs. 
 
    12
2.1.1 Static Assessment Techniques 
The main technique used for static assessment is formal verification. It is based on 
reasoning whether a program will work in accordance to specifications using 
mathematical proof checking. There are several theories that have matured over the years 
and culminated in proper proving techniques. A few of these are Hoare’s axiomatic 
method [34], Floyd’s inductive method [35] and structural induction [35][36]. Several 
textbooks explain these methods in detail [35]. 
One of the chief drawbacks with formal verification is the lack of mechanized 
proof verification tools [6]. To prove a program functionally correct, one manually 
performs the proof. When dealing with high consequence systems, the complexity of the 
software may be high. Consequently, this leads to two main problems. The proof turns 
out to be tedious and, abiding by the adage “to err is human”, erroneous proofs can 
result. 
Another aspect is transcribing the program into mathematical models. With 
increased complexity of systems and increased complexity of languages, it seems 
difficult to apply formal techniques to assess the correct functioning. 
In principle, reliability of software can be quantified either by formal verification 
or by statistical testing. The requirements specification of DOLILU II was written in 
plain English and no attempt was made to formalize it with any form of mathematical 
notation. Furthermore, the size and complexity of the specification documents make 
formal program verification virtually impossible. Therefore the assessment of the 
DOLILU system was done by program testing. 
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2.1.2 Dynamic Assessment Techniques 
Several techniques have been proposed over the years that fall into this category. 
Some of the notable ones are, fault based assessments and statistical based methods. 
Voas, Miller and others [38] proposed fault injection techniques to assess reliability. In 
this method, one physically injects faults into the program. The process is termed 
software fault injection. The software is then tested to determine whether faults can be 
detected. Intuitively, this form of testing gives us insight into the test coverage obtained 
from test cases. For more information on this type of testing one might refer to 
[6][38][37]. When dealing with safety critical systems, which have a tendency almost 
never to fail, fault-based methods do not provide sufficient knowledge of the reliability of 
software.  
In this thesis, we shall deal with what is termed black box testing. In this type of 
testing we treat the software as a black box and test it statistically until it satisfies the 
reliability requirements.  
Musa proposed, that, to quantify the reliability of the software we need to have a 
proper, well-defined, approach towards testing. He suggested the use of operational 
profiles to dictate testing [19]. Operational profiles portray the likely field use of the 
software. He even illustrated how one may develop the operational profile by doing a 
case study. Exhaustive testing is infeasible and testing alone does not guarantee the 
absence of faults. The rationale behind Musa’s work is, if testing was directed by the 
operational usage (operations that take place most often) of the software, the likelihood of 
detecting faults is enhanced and thus, the reliability estimate becomes more realistic.  
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The major drawback is that it is difficult to determine the operational profile for 
much software and it is difficult to predict the changes in the estimate of reliability, for 
changes in the input profile. Interestingly, if one wanted to develop the operational 
profile for DOLILU II system, it is noted that all the functions of the system need to be 
exercised. The rules for evaluation may be divided into single point evaluation and a 
range evaluation (for different parts of the trajectory). We shall now discuss the statistical 
reliability assessment method. 
2.1.2.1 Statistical Assessment Methods 
 
In this thesis, we have used methods for evaluation of reliability of DOLILU II. 
In this method of analysis, there are two approaches, black box approach and white box 
approach. In the black box approach, the program under test is visualized as a function f 
that maps all points in the input space into the corresponding points in the output space. 
No knowledge of the implementation of the program is required. There is another school 
of thought that uses the knowledge of the implementation (the code) to direct tests. This 
methodology is termed white box testing. Here test cases are derived from the input based 
on execution path coverage, or specifications. Both these methods divide the input 
domain is into two portions, failure causing and non-failure causing inputs. We shall now 
introduce the notion of reliability. 
Intuitively, reliability is tied with failures, the more the number of failures the 
lesser the reliability. If a total of n test runs were conducted and, of these, if nf inputs led 
to incorrect results, according to the Nelson model, which derives the relationship 
between reliability and the number of test cases executed, the estimated reliability R 
(which is the proportion of right executions) is 
 






    
or 
If number of test runs is large, n->∞, the fraction nf / n approaches zero, when nf is 
significantly smaller than n. The above equation approaches unity. According to this 
model, the more the test cases that are executed and the fewer failures one observes; the 
higher is the reliability of the software.  
Safety critical systems are characterized by a very high degree of dependability. 
Development is rigorous in nature and the possibility of faults in design process is 
reduced. Reliability assessment is done during the validation phase of the software life 
cycle. Due to the nature of the software, it is unlikely that the software would exhibit 
failures during final testing. Consider the case when we have executed 1000 test cases 
and observed no failures (nf = 0), then, according to the Nelson model the estimate of 
reliability is 1. The fraction nf / n is the failure probability. Is this a true estimate? The 
question now arises, how do we predict the failure probability when we do not see any 
failures? 
Statistical assessment is done by selecting inputs randomly from the input domain 
and testing the software. The foundation for this form of assessment lies in statistical 
sampling theory [27]. Testing is done by randomly picking out inputs from the input 
space. From statistical point of view this may be represented as a Bernoulli trial [6]. 
Reliability assessment assumes sampling with replacement for easier and economical 
implementation of software testing. Since the input space is astronomical in size, the 
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Classical theory helps predict the probability of failure using the Laplace rule of 
succession [31]. If one samples the input space which has an unknown number of failure 
causing inputs and after running t tests on the software, if no faults are detected then the 
probability of failure in a single run is given by 




This indicates that failure probability is inversely proportional to the number of test cases 
executed. This is intuitive as the greater the number of correctly executed test cases the 
more is one’s confidence in the software being tested. 
To establish a failure rate of less than 10-9 failures per hours we need to test the 
program for 109 hours. The alternative solution is to make prior assumptions about the 
quality of software [28][13][3][6]. Chapter 4 in the thesis deals with the Bayesian 
framework for reliability assessment, which uses prior subjective beliefs to be 
incorporated into the model. 
It is not sufficient if one could predict the failure probability θ, of the program. 
We must gain confidence that the predicted value of θ does in fact depict the realistic 
estimate of θ . 
Input domain models are plagued by the following shortcomings 
•  large number of test cases 
•  The assumption of a test oracle: oracles decide whether the result from a test 
run is correct or incorrect unequivocally. Building test oracles is difficult. In 
this thesis, we define premises on how to create a test oracle. 
•  Reliability estimation depends upon the ability to closely approximate/predict 
the operational profile of the field use.[41]  
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Despite these potential problems, a strong theoretical background of sampling 
theory is the basis for choosing the input domain approach to assessing DOLILU II. 
There are several techniques suggested in literature for effective testing of the 
software. They all address the method of test data selection. The most popularly known 
are code coverage techniques (branch testing and path testing), specification based 
strategies [16][21], data flow criteria [17][18], and the domain strategy [22]. All these 
methods share a common characteristic: the program’s input domain is divided into 
subsets called subdomains. One or more inputs from each of these subdomains are 
selected as representatives of the subdomain. This approach is called partition-testing 
[24]. 
Studies by Duran and Naftos[29] and Hamlet and Taylor[30] showed that there is 
only a marginal difference in finding bugs between partition testing and random testing. 
 In the remaining part of the thesis, chapter 4 and 5, we shall discuss the 
applicability of these methods for the assessment of DOLILU II system. We discuss the 
relative merits and their problems in trying to assess the reliability of the trajectory 
evaluation system. 
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3.0 Chapter 3: Day of Launch I-Load Update System (DOLILU II) 
 
The DOLILU II system for the Space Shuttle program has been developed for 
the generation of launch trajectories and to allow modification of the shuttle’s first stage 
guidance commands based on wind conditions (atmospheric conditions) measured hours 
preceding the launch. The system consists of trajectory software required to generate 
trajectories and verify guidance commands to recommend decisions on whether to fly or 
not to fly. It is clear that DOLILU is a high consequence system i.e., there is very high 
cost and a risk of life associated with the eventual occurrence of a failure. 
The decision making process may me viewed as consisting of four independent 
stages: 
•  Tracking and Wind Profiling stage: forms the first stage in the process. This process 
assimilates data the from the launch balloons (tracking system), uses interpolation and 
extrapolation techniques for the generation of wind, temperature and pressure profiles 
based on altitude and time (wind profiling). This is shown as Tracking and Generate 
Wind Profile in figure 3.1. 
•  Trajectory and Guidance Commands stage: there are two processes involved in this 
stage. They are Day-of-launch Ascent Design System (DADS) and Space Vehicle 
Dynamic Simulation (SVDS). DADS, generates the initialization loads (first stage 
guidance commands) and the launch trajectories for the day-of-launch (DOL) 
atmospheric conditions. SVDS generates a trajectory for mean monthly atmospheric 
conditions surrounding DOL with DADS generated guidance commands for these 
conditions and one for DOL conditions. 
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Figure 3.1: Integrated Day-of-Launch I-Load Update (DOLILU II) System Diagram 
 
•  Verification stage: this stage forms the penultimate stage in the decision process. This 
process evaluates wind and trajectory conditions against the guidance commands to 
ensure the launch would not be fatal. We call this stage the Trajectory Evaluation 
Stage. 
•  Experts Team: after the evaluation process is completed by DOLILU II system, a 
team of experts analyze the results obtained from the system and finally decide 
whether to make the flight or not. 
In order to increase the reliability of the system, NASA adopted design diversity, 
to make the system more fault tolerant. There are two separate computational lanes 
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trajectories generated are deemed valid only if the outputs of both the lanes agree in their 
analysis. In this thesis, we are interested in the assessment methodologies for the primary 
system, especially the Trajectory Evaluation System. 
3.1 DOLILU II – Primary System  
 
The tracking systems receive the wind and atmospheric data from the balloons 
released a few hours before the scheduled time of launch. The data is fed into the wind 
profile generation processor. As the name suggests the primary function of this processor 
is to generate the profiles in the required data format understandable to the remaining part 
of the system. 
The TLAMS (Trajectory and Load Analysis Management System, shown in the 
diagram as the executive) initiates the next sequence of events for trajectory and guidance 
commands generation and their validation. It invokes the Day-of-launch Ascent Design 
System (DADS). DADS processor generates the guidance commands and simulates the 
trajectories for the day of launch conditions. Guidance commands (I-Loads) and 
measured winds are passed on to the Space Vehicle Dynamic Simulation (SVDS) 
processor. SVDS produces two trajectory files, one is called the reference trajectory 
(REFTRAJ), and this is simulated for mean monthly wind conditions. It also creates a 
second trajectory file (DOLITRAJ) which uses the updated I-loads and present wind 
conditions. 
Near real-time verification is the most critical function of the DOLILU system. 
Successfully simulated trajectories and their corresponding I-loads (guidance commands) 
are verified for conformance with safety related rules, called envelopes. The envelopes 
have been derived from previous experience (experience envelopes) and known system 
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constraints (system envelopes). If any of the system constraint rules are violated then the 
violation must be reported. A violation, when plotted, would be clearly seen to exceed the 
system and experience envelopes. Such a flight trajectory is generally deemed invalid and 
must be dismissed. TLAMS executive invokes the Day of launch I-Load Verification 
Table (DIVDT) processor, which performs trajectory verification. DIVDT verifies 
trajectories based on a predefined set of rules[40].  
The DIVDT should detect all potentially unsafe flight conditions, verifying the outputs 
from all the other processors of DOLILU system. Therefore, the reliability quantification 
of the DIVDT processor is highly desirable.  
3.2 Day-of-launch I-Load Verification Data Table (DIVDT) 
 
DIVDT evaluates the trajectory conditions against the guidance commands (I-
loads) that are generated. The process of evaluation is done based on rules defined in the 
Quality Assurance Document [40]. Rules are classified as (in their increasing order of 
importance) 
•  System Constraint Rules (S-rules): Any violation is considered being a failure to 
make the flight. These rules affect the integrity of the system. 
•  Experience Constraint Rules (E-rules): Design engineers based on their experience 
with the system determine these rules. They are similar to S-rules but provide some 
more latitude in their evaluation.  They help the experts’ team in their final decision 
E.g. if the percentage of exceedance is not large for a given S-rule and is contained 
well within limits of the corresponding E-rule then the team may pass the rule. 
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•  Processor Rules (P-rules): these sets of rules are defined for the processor integrity. 
They deal with the interfaces between the various processors. They check whether the 
data is conveyed properly between the various processors. 
•  Abort Region Determinator Rules: special rules that are defined for the safety of the 
flight. 
DIVDT has two modes of execution 
•  Normal Mode 
•  QA mode 
In the normal mode, it verifies that I-Loads generated by DADS is acceptable for 
flight by evaluating trajectory parameters in accordance with the DOLILU II Quality 
Assurance Rules. [40] The QA mode provides rapid quality assurance of a trajectory 
without a preceding DADS I-Loads generation. The trajectory is generated close to 
launch using the latest day-of-launch (DOL) environment, generated at an earlier balloon 
release time. All functions of the QA mode remain the same as normal mode except for 
the following 
•  Omission of the DADS-generated trajectory files 
•  Omission of DIVDT “P” and “A” rules evaluation. 
•  Omissions of outputs for “P” and “A” rules in the DIVDT output summary.1 
DIVDT requires several inputs for it proper operation. They are as follows 
I. SVDS simulated trajectories 
There are two trajectory files that are generated by SVDS 
                                                           
1 P = Processor rules, A = Abort Region Determinator Rules 
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 svds_15_ref: a reference trajectory, which could be any of the previously created 
SVDS trajectory files. This helps in the definition of experience envelope. Typically 
it contains mean monthly environments and pre-launch predicted mass properties. 
The I-Loads used are DADS generated I-Loads designed for the launch month’s mean 
environments. 
 svds_15: is SVDS trajectory file that is usually generated with the DADS updated I-
Loads and measured winds (normal mode).  
II. DADS generated trajectories and I-Loads 
 dads_15: is a trajectory that is internally created by DADS. This is required only in 
the normal mode of execution. 
 dads_iloads: is required only in the normal mode of operation. Contains the DADS 
generated I-Loads (guidance commands) and the ARD (abort region determination) 
engine modeling data. 
 ard_divdt: is created by DADS and contains ARD parameters to be verified by 
DIVDT. Required only in the normal mode. 
III. Limits input files 
 DIVDTINPUT: limits input file used to input the variable limit values for each rule 
identified in [40]. 
 VENTDATA: contains limit arrays for the venting carpet constraint. 
During the entire execution of the program there is no user intervention. DIVDT 
evaluates the rules and provides a summary of the results in ASCII (text summary files) 
as well as binary data files (plot data files). The evaluation takes place in three stages, 
first stage of flight, staging (this refers to pre-orbital insertion stage) and orbiting stage 
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(MECO). Plot files created by DIVDT are passed to the DIVPLT program, which 
generates plot outputs. The output files of DIVDT are described below 
•  Divdt_control: file containing the flight number, atmosphere balloon release time, 
wind balloon release time, and up to ten of the highest DIVDT rule violations. 
•  Divdt_stdplt: a file containing plot data for all the rules. 
•  Divdt_rsplot: containing plot data for Range Safety Rule, a system constraint rule. 
•  Divdt_thrplt: containing plot data for Altitude Constraint Rule. 
•  Divdt_trjsum: a file containing trajectory summary and evaluation of parameters at 
critical points in the trajectory (i.e. first stage, staging, MECO). 
•  Divdt_topten: a top-ten summary of the discrete rules with the highest percentage of 
exceedance. A summary of the DOLILU I-Loads is also given. 
•  Divdt_detail: a detailed summary of all the rules evaluated with their percentage of 
exceedance and a verdict of PASS or FAIL for each rule. 
•  Divdt_summary: a summary of the list of rules arranged in the descending order by 
their percentage of exceedance. 
Further information about the quality assurance rules and DIVDT functioning could be 
obtained from the following documents [39][40]. 
3.3 Assessment Methodologies for DIVDT 
 
As mentioned earlier, DOLILU II is a high consequence system. Prior to this 
work there has been no attempt to determine the reliability assessment of the software. 
Acceptance test cases identified in [43] represent the minimum testing required to 
evaluate the completeness and accuracy of the software. Testing criteria specifically 
addresses verification of logic paths, data handling, and design constraints that may be 
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encountered during the normal operation of DIVDT. Tests are performed to verify 
compliance with functional requirements. After system testing, one of the following 
decisions must be made 
•  Acceptance of software: following the designated testing period the formal software 
configuration will be completed. 
•  Conditional Acceptance of software: contains conditions that had errata in them. It 
furnishes information of testing that needs to be done after the errors have been 
corrected. It is observed that only the corrected regions of the software are re-tested, 
but from our experience we know that changes made in the software could affect 
other regions in the program. Hence we need to perform tests on the complete 
software to ensure that the changes did not create new errors. 
•  Rejection of software: this is accompanied by the details of the requirements that 
were not met. Rejected software needs to be re-tested with all tests before formal 
acceptance. 
The test philosophy ensures that all the rules are being exercised. The tests were 
designed for external interfaces, design, and program logic. Some of the techniques used 
are enumerated in the following subsections. 
3.3.1 Inspection 
Inspection is a manual verification technique in which the program (code, data) is 
examined to discover discrepancies with requirements. Code walk-through and code 
inspections were some of the techniques adopted here. 
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3.3.2 Analysis 
Analysis involved formal verification methods, to analyze the functions. As these 
methods required rigorous mathematics, only a subset of the functions was analyzed this 
way. 
3.3.3 Testing 
Testing is performed with a specified set of steps, which will result in some 
expected results. The expected results are also documented along with the test results. 
3.3.4 Demonstration 
Typically this method is used to gain confidence that software will not abort 
under certain conditions. Incorrect input file format or a missing file is typical conditions 
that require demonstration 
3.3.5 Comparison Against Results from Previous Version 
Regression testing of the software is done to ensure that changes have not 
adversely altered the function form the previous version. Identical data sets are used to 
test both the versions and the results are compared. 
Software testing is based on the criticality of the part during the evaluation 
process. Tests were classified into 5 sections,  
 External interfaces: deal with the P-rules, external processors communicating with 
DIVDT. They tested for conformance of data. 
 Internal interfaces: deals with testing DIVDT for correct rules evaluation. A 
combination of the aforementioned techniques was adopted. 
 Limit testing: deals with limit based checking 
 
    27
 Top ten testing: manually manipulated trajectory data for a selected 10 rules and 
checked for confirmation from the DIVDT output summary. 
 Worst Value testing. 
Further description of strategies may be obtained from [43]. 
The techniques described were not used to assess the reliability of DOLILU II 
system. They only stress tested the system for conformance with the specifications. This 
gave us an opportunity to devise new techniques to assess the reliability of the software. 
 
The next chapter deals with the Bayesian Inference Framework for reliability assessment. 
In the framework we try to incorporate our belief in the system using the knowledge that 
it has already been in use and tested. We do this by incorporating subjective probability 
into our model. 
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4.0 Chapter 4: Assessment Methodologies 
 
Reliability assessment of systems must be based on precisely defined concepts in 
order to make comparisons between systems possible and to provide a logical basis to 
improve the system’s reliability [28].  
In most life critical applications, one has to establish that software reliability is 
indeed high. Butler and Finelli [51] classified software systems into three types namely, 
•  Ultrahigh reliability:  < 10-7 failures/hour, 
•  Moderate Reliability:  10-3 – 10-7 failures/hour, 
•  Low Reliability:   > 10-3 failures/hour. 
Unlike hardware, where reliability is associated with physical faults, software programs 
have faults induced in them from the beginning (requirements documents) to through out 
the life cycle. Nevertheless, when we view the system as an entity, subjecting it to inputs 
and observing the outputs, the system either produces a correct or an incorrect result. This 
may be viewed as a stochastic process, where the software produces errors in a stochastic 
manner [51]. Based on this observation we may now define software reliability: 
Software reliability is the probability of failure free executions of the 
software, over a given period of time and within a specified environment. 
Consider the following simplistic model for modeling software reliability. The software 
is subjected to external inputs. The program is viewed as a black box function f that maps 
the inputs to the corresponding points in the output domain. The same software is 
repeatedly executed for each of these inputs. There exist only two possible outcomes, 
either the software executes correctly and produces the right output, or the software 
executes incorrectly and produces an incorrect result. If we assume a constant failure rate 
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(per input), say θ, then testing can be modeled as a binomial process. The number of 
failures F after n inputs is then given by 
rnr
r
nCrFP −−== )1()( θθ         (4.1) 
where r represents the total number of failures observed for n inputs. The term rnC  is an 









We need to determine the probability of system failure for n inputs, failures can 







       (4.2) 
With our assumption of constant failure rate over time, we may represent n in terms of 
time; n = kt where k = number of inputs/unit time then 
   kttP )1(1)( θ−−=           (4.3) 
With kt being large in comparison with θ, (1-θ)kt may be approximated as e-θkt. This is 
obtained from the Poisson approximation to binomial discrete distribution.  Hence some 
researchers assume that the time to failure distribution is exponential. 
Traditionally, the method of software creation involves a cycle, where the 
software is created, then sufficiently tested. When an error is found, the bug is fixed and 
the software is tested again. This forms the basis for “Reliability growth models” (RGM).  
The goal for these models is to fit mathematical models to predict what would be the 
estimated reliability of the final version of the software, based on inter-failure time 
observation. There are numerous RGMs, the reader may refer to [6] for a concise 
description of these. 
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There are several problems in potentially applying reliability growth models for 
assessment of DIVDT (DOLILU II). When considering reliability growth models, the 
mean time to failure increases, (shown to exponential by Musa's model, others used log-
linear distribution [51]) and consequently the failure probability decreases as more and 
more bugs are fixed. However, what should be an acceptable time frame before the model 
can achieve ultrahigh reliability? Miller and Keiller [52] stated that the time frame would 
be prohibitively large. Another problem is when the software itself doesn’t exhibit any 
failures. This is typical of safety-critical software. How could one fit a distribution with 
no observed failures during acceptance testing? We require a model that overcomes these 
difficulties. 
4.1 Bayesian Inference Framework 
 
Rev. Thomas Bayes’ paper first published in 1763 provides the basis for 
“Bayesian Statistical Inference”. Due to its fundamental importance, the paper was re-
published in 1958 [28,45]. Several factors have contributed towards the recent resurgence 
and wide scale acceptance of the theory.  
The cornerstone of Bayesian inference is the notion of subjective probability. 
Such a notion contrasts with the well-perceived notion of frequency for probability 
estimation. The axiom of probability states that the probability of an event has to be 
estimated by determining the value of success ratio. To progress towards this empirical 
estimation, one has to conduct trials repeatedly, in which the event occurs. 
Subjective probability deals not only with the events but with propositions as 
well. A proposition is considered as a collection of events that contribute towards the 
estimation based on previous events, observed behavior or the reflection of one’s belief in 
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the system. In statistical terms, we hypothesize that the event does occur with the 
estimated probability. As evidence increases relevant to the hypothesis, we then change 
our degree of belief in the hypothesis.  Interestingly, some argue that subjective 
probabilities assigned to a particular hypothesis may indeed be quite individualistic [28]. 
In other words, the probabilities assigned by different individuals would reflect different 
beliefs yielding different results. Bayesian inference theory circumvents this in the 
posterior analysis where our degree of belief changes with the observations made. 
However, egregious probability assumptions are definitely not permissible. 
4.1.1 Classical Probability Theory versus Bayesian Inference 
There are distinctive differences between the classical theory and Bayesian 
methods of inference. In classical theory approach, the unknown parameter to be 
estimated (θ ) is assumed to be a fixed constant. A point estimator, which is a function of 
the data set (observed) is chosen according to some principle such as minimum variance, 
least squares or the method of moments. Classical theory inferences are then made using 
inductive reasoning. The Classical method of inference is depicted in Figure 4.1. The 
process begins with the postulating of a sampling model. Inductive reasoning is used in 
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Bayesian method of reasoning is deductive. The parameter of interest (θ ) is 
assumed to be a random variable with a priori distribution g(θ). This distribution 
expresses the assessor’s state of knowledge or ignorance about θ before the sample data, 
say y, is analyzed. Given the prior distribution, and the data set y, Bayes’ theorem is used 
to calculate the posterior distribution g(θ|y).  
The prior distribution in a Bayesian analysis usually embodies a subjective notion 
of probability. It is the distribution of degree of belief about θ before the observational 
data (y) is obtained. A distinctive feature of Bayesian inference is that it takes explicit 
account of prior information in the analysis. This contrasts with the classical approach of 
sampling theory. Figure 4.2 depicts the Bayesian method of inference. The process 
begins with a postulated sampling model. A prior probability distribution is also assumed. 
The sample data and the prior distribution are combined by the use of Bayes’ theorem 
(explained in section 4.1.3). Deductive reasoning is then used in conjunction with the 
resulting posterior distribution to produce the desired inferences about the parameters of 
the assumed sampling model. 
 There are two further distinctive differences between sampling theory and 
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prior distribution, produces inferences that are more informative. The second distinction 
is that the Bayesian method usually requires less sample data to achieve the same quality 
of inferences than methods based on sampling theory. 
4.1.2 Advantages of Bayesian Inference in Software Reliability 
Software reliability estimation methods based on sampling theory have been 
found useful for a variety of problems. There are, however, many instances in which the 
classical methods have been found to be less than satisfactory. There has been an ever-
increasing demand for cost-effectiveness in reliability assessments of systems, typically 
safety critical systems. Sampling methods for software reliability estimation cause 
problems when based on scarce failure data. When observing the failure rates of software 
for commercial nuclear power plants [28], it was observed that the mean time to failures 
is t = 7.9 x 106 h.  As a consequence it is not possible to determine a two-sided 
confidence interval estimate on a constant failure rate, assuming an exponential failure 
time model. The point estimate would be zero, an overly optimistic estimate.  
As another example, consider estimating the failure rate based on sample data 
consisting of zero observed failures in many reactor years of commercial operation. We 
are faced with the same situation as in our preceding example. These examples are 
reflective of problems in estimating the reliability of DIVDT (DOLILU II) software since 
no failures have been observed during test executions. We do know that the software has 
been successfully operating over the past five years. How does one incorporate this 
information into the estimation model? In situations like these, the methods based on 
sampling theory are frequently replaced in favor of more useful methods, like the 
Bayesian approach. 
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As mentioned earlier there are two important practical benefits in using Bayesian 
analysis. One is the increased quality of inferences, provided the prior information 
incorporated in the model reflects the true variation in the parameter(s). The other is the 
reduction in testing requirements. There is yet another advantage. Inferences that are 
inaccurate arise from incorrect assumptions and not from inadequacies of the method 
used to provide them.  
Bayesian methods provide a satisfactory way of explicitly introducing and 
organizing assumptions regarding prior knowledge or ignorance. These assumptions lead, 
via Bayes’ theorem, to posterior inferences about the reliability of parameter(s) of 
interest. 
4.1.3 Bayes’ Theorem with Subjective Probabilities 
Bayes’ theorem is the fundamental tool used to arrive at Bayesian inferences. Let 
θ denote the parameter of interest that we would like to estimate. The prior model 
represents the subjective information available about θ before the observation of the 


















The posterior model tells us what is known about θ given the knowledge of the data x. It 
is intuitive that the posterior model should represent an updated version of our prior 
knowledge of θ. If the data supports our belief, there should be an increased confidence 
in the subjective notions. On the other hand if the sample data does not support the 
subjective information, the posterior model should give a weighted consideration of both 
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assessments, the sample data and prior. This is achieved by using Bayes’ theorem. The 
posterior distribution is given by 









where f(x) represents the marginal distribution and may be obtained by 
   f x f x g d( ) ( | ) ( )= ∫ θ θ θ . 
4.2 Bayesian Reliability Assessment of DIVDT (DOLILU II) 
 
The primary reason in adopting the Bayesian approach is to incorporate in our 
reliability assessment model the knowledge that the system has already been in use and, 
prior to that, rigorously tested. Furthermore, the techniques adopted for the creation of the 
software shows that the system was indeed developed using proper software engineering 
practices. 
4.2.1 Choice of Prior Distribution 
There are several papers in literature [13,46] and books [28,47] that have provided 
guidelines in choosing a proper prior distribution. For our framework, we chose beta 
distribution to accurately reflect prior beliefs. There are two primary reasons in choosing 
this distribution.  
i. By proper choice of the parameters, it is possible to depict any type of distribution 
that is actually exhibited by the system. 
ii. The distribution forms a conjugate family. The conjugate family has the property 
that both the prior and posterior distributions will be members of the same 
parametric family of distributions [46,47]. Intuitively this represents a kind of 
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homogeneity in the way in which our beliefs are represented, and how they change 
as we receive extra information [13]. 
The intention here is to devise a framework that attests that if the system executes 
n demands without failure then it is deemed to have achieved the required confidence in 
reliability estimate. Within the Bayesian framework we represent our prior knowledge 
about the parameter of interest, here the probability of failure on demand denoted as θ, by 












        (4.4) 
where B(p,q) is the beta function with p>0, q>0, p and q represent our prior belief in θ 
for the software under test. Assuming ignorance prior implies that it is equally likely to  
      Figure 4.3: Graph for beta(p,q) with p=q=1, equally likely distribution 
 
have any value of θ in the range 0-1. If we set the values of p and q as p=q=1 and 
substitute in equation (1) we obtain a f(θ) = 1, rectangular probability distribution as  
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The goal of reliability assessment is not just to estimate the failure probability but 
to gain statistical confidence that the estimate is indeed realistic. In practice the required 
failure rate θ and the confidence level C are usually predefined. The question is how 
much testing needs to be done? 
Let T be a random variable denoting the total number of test cases that need to be 
executed until the first failure is detected. To achieve a required confidence, an unknown 
number of test cases U needs to be executed such that  
   .)(Pr CUTob =≤          (4.5) 
Considering the classical sampling theory for estimating, the distribution of T is assumed 
geometric and the probability that T assumes a particular value t is given by 
    .)1()(Pr 1−−== ttTob θθ             (4.6) 
Combining equation (4.5) and (4.6), we get the equation relating U and C. 
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−θθ          (4.8) 
The left-hand side of the equation (4.8) is a geometric series and can be computed as 


















t        (4.9) 
Substituting (4.9) in (4.8) we get 
    ( ( ) )1 1− − =θ U C        (4.10) 
Solving equation (4.10) for U we get 
    CU −=− 1)1( θ .       (4.11) 
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Taking loge on both sides, the required number of test cases U, is therefore  








1 θ .       (4.12)  
In the Bayesian framework of assessment if the system has executed n demands and we 
have seen r failures, we get posterior distribution of f(θ) to be [46,47]. 
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Assuming ignorance prior, we get p=q=1, therefore 
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.      (4.14) 
If we require U demands before detecting the first failure then n=U, r=0, therefore 
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B(1,1+U) is the complete beta function. The generalized form is 




11 )1(),( babaB θθ        (4.16) 
Therefore B(1,1+U) is given by 
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+∫ θ θ      (4.17) 
It is required that the failure rate θ should be less than the pre-mediated value p0 with 
confidence level C. Now Prob(θ<p0) is the cumulative density function given by  
                      Pr ( ) ( | , , , )ob p f U d
p




.      (4.18) 
Mathematically we represent the above statement as 
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   Pr ( )ob p Cθ ≤ ≥0 .        (4.19) 
Substituting equation (4.17) in (4.18) we get  
   f U C
o
p
( | , , , )θ 0 1 1
0
∫ ≥ .        (4.20) 
Substituting for f(θ|U,0,1,1) from equation (4.14) we get 












d C .       (4.21) 
Combining equations (4.20) and (4.16) and integrating we get 
   ( )( )1 1
0
0
+ − =∫ U d CU
p
θ θ .       (4.22) 
The solution for the above equation yields the result in the following form 























.      (4.23) 
Simplifying equation (4.22) we get  
    Cp U =−− +10 )1(1 .        (4.24) 
Taking loge on both sides and solving equation (4.23) for U, we get the total number of 
test cases required to achieve with defined confidence C that the reliability requirement 
p0 is satisfied as  








CU .        (4.25) 
Comparing equation (4.24) and (4.12) we realize that they are the same. It is clear that 
since p=q=1 provide no knowledge, they do not influence the interpretation of the test 
results. Hence, both Classical and Bayesian theory require almost the same number of 
cases in the absence of prior knowledge of failure distribution. 
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Now we shall introduce our prior belief into the framework. Before we do this we 
need to justify our claim in the prior distribution. Two main reasons encourage our belief 
 The software has been in use for the past couple of years. As already discussed in 
chapter 3, several methodologies, partial correctness proofs, inspection, code walk-
through were already adopted in testing the software piecewise. However we would 
like to reiterate that there has been no attempt in assessing the reliability of the 
software. 
 A rigorous development process was adopted and two different versions of the 
software were developed for added redundancy adding to the fault tolerance of the 
system.  
Considering the above factors, especially the fact that the software has been 
operational failure free for more than five years, rigorously tested and stringently 
developed, we could safely assume that the software at least exhibited a failure 
probability of 10-3 failures/h.  According to [13,28,47] we could assign the values to p 
and q to reflect this belief. We get p=8 and q=9850 (see Appendix B Table B.1) Now our 
complete beta function is (taking a=p and b=q+U) 
  B p q U p q U( , ) ( )+ = −− + −∫ θ θ1 1
0
1
1              (4.26) 
Repeated integration by parts and simplification yields (see Appendix B Solve B.1) 
   B p q U
p
q U q U q U p
( , )
( ) !
( )( ). . . . ( )
+ =
−
+ + + + + −
1
1 1
   (4.27) 
Taking n=U, r=0 (no failures observed), equation (4.12) reduces to  
   f U p q
B p q U
p q U
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In equation (4.18) we substitute (4.27), we get 
    f U p q C
p
( | , , , )θ 0
0
0
≥∫       (4.29) 
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We used MathCAD to solve equation (4.28). We substituted the values for p0 = 10-3, 10-
4...10-7 with C = 0.99. Numerical solutions obtained for the above equation is given in 
table 4.2. 
A comparison between the total number of test cases required by random 
sampling and the equivalent number of test cases required using the Bayesian framework 
is shown in tables 4.1 and 4.2 and figure 4.7 and 4.8 
Table 4.1:  Number of test cases from Random Sampling (C=0.99) 
Random Sampling 








Table 4.2: Number of Test Cases using Bayesian Framework (C=0.99),  
      assuming θ=10-5 
 Bayesian Method 







    42
 
 In [13] Bev Littlewood states that in order to assess the reliability in a Bayesian 
Framework, we first need to believe that the system indeed exhibits the proposed failure 
rate before testing. The posterior analysis would then endorse this belief in our system 
from the testing results.  
Table 4.3:  Number of Test Cases using Bayesian Framework (C=0.99)  
 Bayesian Method 







 When testing reveals failures it translates into our posterior model by decreasing 
our belief that the probability of failure has been achieved. Consider equation 4.14, when 
testing reveals failures, the value of r in the equation increases. This decreases the power 
for the factor (1-θ) and increases the power for the factor θ . This shows that the new 
distribution now decreases our initial belief. If no errors were detected, then the 
distribution changes with an increase our original belief (as the power of (1-θ) now 
increases). 
In table 4.3, we compute the total number of test cases required before the first 
failure occurs to ensure with a confidence of 0.99 (having a prior belief obtained from 
Table B.2 in Appendix B for each θ ) that the software did indeed exhibit the proposed 
failure probability. 
It is clear from the tables, that in order to obtain a reasonable time frame to test a 
system, we need to believe that the system did indeed achieve the proposed degree of 
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failure rate before testing. The purpose for testing is to endorse this belief. If the system 
did not achieve the proposed reliability, then this is reflected in our posterior analysis.  
The cornerstone for Bayesian Inference is the subjective knowledge of the system 
that is incorporated into the assessment model. One has to understand how one might 
provide values for the priors p and  q. 
Consider Table B.3 is Appendix B. This shows the variation in the number of test 
cases when we try to decrease the amount of variation in our prior model. As one 
traverses the table downwards, this is indicative of decreased variance in our prediction 
and the consequent increase in the number of test cases.  
Hence, if we need a greater degree of confidence in our prior beliefs itself we 
need to execute more number of test cases.  
4.2.2 Extended testing with occurrence of failure 
The above subsection predicts the total number of test cases that needs to be 
executed correctly before we deem that the software has indeed achieved the required 
failure probability at the required confidence. How should one proceed in the eventuality 
of a failure? When using the Bayesian Framework in reliability assessment, we could use 
the information that testing has yielded until the first failure was observed [46]. To 
predict how many future test cases need to be done after the failure has been revealed we 
could use the posterior distribution obtained until the first failure occurred. Let us assume 
that a failure occurred after the execution of s demands (s < n the estimated number of 
demands). The posterior for θ immediately following the failure on the sth demand 
   f s p q
B p s q
p s













    (4.31) 
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This forms the prior distribution for θ for further testing that needs to be conducted. We 
now need to compute U1 the total number of failure-free executions required for the 
software to exhibit the required probability density function; this is 
   f U s p q
B p U s q
p U s q














+ + + −
+ + −
    (4.32) 
Notice that this is simply the posterior distribution after seeing both (s-1) failure free 
executions followed by a failure, and then seeing U1 further failure free demands. This 
posterior distribution will be the same whenever the single failure occurred among s+U1 
demands: it depends only upon the total number of demands, and the number of failures. 
Now we may compute U1 for which  






p p U s q
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      (4.33) 
In general, if we have seen in the rth failure and the failures occurred on the s1th, (s1+s2)th, 
…….,(s1+s2+s3+…..+sr)th demands we should require an additional Ur demands 
executed failure-free, such that  























     (4.34) 
Having developed a framework to assess DIVDT (DOLILU II), we need to address two 
important issues when estimating software. How does one accelerate the execution of 
software in order to achieve an agreeable period for testing the software? How does one 
generate the input conditions to test the system?  
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5.0 Chapter 5.0: Acceleration of Test Cases 
 
 After establishing a framework for reliability assessment of DIVDT (DOLILU II) 
using Bayesian inference, we were faced with another unique problem that required 
immediate attention. The time taken for the execution of each test run of the software is 
too long given the amount of testing required. Typically DIVDT (DOLILU II) takes on 
an average (assuming a normal mode of execution for Day of Launch I-Load Verification 
Data Table (DIVDT)) 20 to 25 minutes [43] for a single run. Despite the reduction in the 
number of test cases, around 200000 test case executions still need to be performed. This 
would amount to around 9-10 years of execution time to certify with 99% confidence that 
DIVDT (DOLILU II) indeed achieved ultrahigh reliability!! Consequently we required a 
reduction in the time for each test case execution. 
5.1 Transformations for Accelerated Execution of Test Cases 
 
Program transformations have been used for code modifications especially in 
code optimizations in order to enhance certain desirable properties such as performance 
or portability. The application of a transformation to a given program is a three-step 
process:  
 Decision: which part of the program do we apply the transformation and what type of 
transformation are we going to use. 
 Verification: ensure that the transformation doesn’t change the meaning (semantics) 
of the program or if it changes it is done in a restricted manner that is acceptable. 
 Actual transformation of the program. 
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 Transformations can be effective only if it is possible to discern whether there are 
benefits in their application.  We expect benefits in the speed of execution of the 
program.  
Semantically equivalent transformations preserve the exact meaning of the 
program under transformation. In other words, the transformed program does operations 
in exactly the same sequence as the original program. It is important to note and quoted 
from [50], that, “semantic transformation is the property of the program execution and 
not the program”. By that, we mean, if the transformed program executes correctly for 
some input we can conclude the original program also executes correctly. If the 
transformed program executes incorrectly for some other input, we can justifiably claim 
the same for the original program. 
 The above transformations are based on source code. One may even speed up 
testing by changing other parameters of influence. E.g. environment conditions can be 
changed, like using a faster processor, or opting for centralized parallel processing to 
distributed computing. These types of transformations are termed configuration 
transformations. 
In this thesis, whenever we refer to a transformed program, it may either refer to a 
source-to-source transformation with unchanged environment conditions, or only 
configuration transformations or a combination of both.  
5.2 Source Transformations 
 
Source-to-source transformations are based on making changes to the software to 
increase the speed of operation of the program. We shall now discuss the different 
techniques that we tried to adopt to decrease the execution time of the software. 
 
    47
5.2.1 Vertical Slicing 
Process control programs are usually very large complex programs constructed by 
composing smaller components like procedures; user defined data types and others. They 
usually compute several output parameters. When developers/users attempt to understand 
and manipulate programs, they achieve this by decomposing the program. This general 
observation led to the concept of program slices first introduced by Weiser [48]. It is a 
straightforward method of decomposing a program into different data flow blocks, by 
analyzing control and data flow. The original algorithm generated static program slices 
from data flow graphs. A static program slice extracted all the statements that affect a 
variable or a subset of variables in the program. A static slice groups statements that 
directly or indirectly affect the value of a given output variable or output variables. The 
program slice constitutes a separately executable program, which preserves a specified 
projection of the original program’s behavior, viz., it computes a subset of the original 
program’s output variables. This form of slicing is referred to as “vertical slicing” as it 
decomposes programs into data blocks in the direction of data flow and control [6][50]. 
The interesting feature of this slicing technique is that, each program slice is 
capable of executing and reproducing the exact behavior of the original program within 
the specified sub-domain in which the slice is defined.  
From the point of view of speed-up gain we have three major consequences by 
using the slicing technique 
 Potential reductions in the number of program statements in each individual slice, 
leading to smaller, faster executable programs. 
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 Each slice is independently executable and consequently this makes parallel 
execution of all the slices feasible. Furthermore, when run concurrently the union of 
the outputs of the all slices forms the output of the original program.  
 Consider when some of the vertical slices could be formally verified. The execution 
of these is deemed unnecessary. Hence, we could reduce the number of vertical slices 
that needs to be executed. 
5.2.2 Reducing numerical precision 
This monotonic transformation technique is based on the fact that, double 
precision arithmetic is more CPU intensive than single precision arithmetic [50]. The 
same applies between single precision and integer computations.  
When programs are decomposed using vertical slicing, each slice can be further 
transformed to hasten the computation process. We can transform all double declarations 
to floats. This transformation is applicable only if the slice itself isn’t computationally 
sensitive. The definition of slice functions that are not sensitive to computational 
precision is borrowed from [50].  
A program function slice is not sensitive to computational precision if and 
only if small fluctuations of the input variables produce a small fluctuation 
in the output variables.  
During the execution of the program slice, if a disparity occurs, the original slice 
is run to compare whether a fault did occur or not. Program slices with sensitive slice 
functions are tested with the original slices. 
When it is known that there is a requirement for only a fixed number of 
significant digits, we may manipulate the calculations to be integer computations. We 
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replace the decimal computations with integer computations by multiplying by a factor of 
10n. After the computations are done, we can determine the final value by dividing the 
final result by 10n. However fractional computations may lead to erroneous results. 
5.3 Environment Changes 
 
Changing environment conditions in which the program is being tested can 
further accelerate testing. One method would be by running on a faster processor.  It is 
important to note that the processors used should be “binary compatible” (representation 
of data types and executables should be alike). 
5.4 Transformations applied for DIVDT (DOLILU II) 
 
We shall now apply the aforementioned methods to decrease the total execution 
time of DIVDT. 
5.4.1 Applying Vertical Slicing to DIVDT (DOLILU II) 
DIVDT evaluates trajectory conditions with the generated I-Loads (initial 
guidance commands) based on pre-defined rules [40]. When decomposing the software, it 
became apparent that we should make the decomposition rules based. This is further 
reassured when one observes output from DIVDT. Every rule is evaluated based on 
trajectory parameters and a verdict is given as a PASS or FAIL for each rule. A list of all 
the rules evaluated as adapted from [40][43][42] is given in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: DOLILU II Quality Assurance Rules 
Rule No Title E6 Roll, Pitch and Yaw Actual 
Accelerations 
S1 Pitch and Yaw I-Load within  
SAIL Envelope 
E7 Roll, Pitch and Yaw Actual Body 
Rates 
S2 Staging Dynamic Pressure E8 SSME Pitch and Yaw Gimbal 
Commands 
S3 Staging Angle of Attack E9 SRB Rock and Tilt Gimbal Cmds 
S4 Staging Angle of Sideslip E10 Pitch and Yaw I-Loads Within 
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Parameter Experience 
S5 Staging Roll, Yaw and Pitch Rates E11 Elevon Hinge Moment Experience 
S6 SRB Apogee Constraint E12 (deleted) 
S7 Elevon Hinge Moment System E13 (deleted) 
S8 Venting Carpet Constraint E14 Staging Velocity 
S9 Heating Carpet Constraint E15 Altitude Rate at SRB Separation 
S10 (deleted) 
S11 (deleted) P1 (deleted) 
S12 (deleted) P2 (deleted) 
S13 Throttle-Altitude Constraint P3 (deleted) 
S14 Range Safety P4 (deleted) 
S15 Margin P5 (deleted) 
S16 Roll, Pitch and Yaw Actual Body 
Rates (Post SAR) 
P6 (deleted) 
S17 (deleted) P7 (deleted) 
S18 Flight Control System P8 DADS Convergence Check 
S19 DADS Wind I-Loads Within SAIL 
Envelope 
P9 (deleted) 
S20 TREF Within SAIL Envelopes P10 SVDS/DADS I-Loads Comparison
S21 Throttle I-Loads within SAIL and 
Certification Envelopes 
P11 I-Loads File Validation 
S22 AGT Occurrence P12 SVDS/DADS Weights @ 150 
Seconds Comparison 
E1 Staging Gamma 
E2 Staging Altitude A1 ARD DELT 
E3 Staging Azimuth A2 ARD AGT 
E4 Roll, Pitch and Yaw Guidance Altitude 
Errors 
  




Before we proceed to apply vertical slicing techniques for speed enhancement, we 
shall define a few terms that would aid in our explanation of the data flow proofs 
provided in Appendix A. A program slice is defined as a set of all program statements for 
a relevant computation. A slicing criterion specifies the slice (computation) for a variable, 
v, at statement n.  Program slices for a given criterion are obtained by deleting zero or 
more statements from the given program P but still computing the same value for v at 
statement n.  
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An important pre-condition for applying vertical slicing is to provide data flow proofs for 
each slice establishing complete independence and semantic integrity of each individual 
slice. Data-flow proofs are given for each rule in Appendix A.  
There is a great degree of redundancy in all the vertical slices. This is because 
even before the execution of rules for evaluation one does checks for input parameter 
consistency and a variety of checks for correct formats.  
Having established the independence of all the slices our model of execution is as 
shown in figure 5.1. We need to replicate the data across all the processes. Certain 
processes like evaluation of P8, P9, P11 may be eliminated as they only check for 








             Figure 5.1: Parallel Execution of DIVDT 
 
5.4.2 Applying Numerical Precision Reduction for DIVDT 
After consulting with NASA personnel and as documented in [43] for testing 
purposes it was sufficient if the precision was considered upto 5 significant digits. We 
transformed all double declarations to floats. As mentioned earlier this method is 
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are based on flow dynamics small changes in the input does not produce large changes in 
the outputs.  
As the number of significant digits were fixed we could use the transformation to 
integer computations by multiplication by 10n and division later by 10n. This could 
further help the computation process. 
5.4.3 Environment Changes 
Now that the possibility of parallel execution has been established, we could opt 
for distributed computing or parallel machine. When changing environments we need to 
ensure binary compatibility. Hence we need to choose binary compatible computers 
during distributed computing. Hence we could chose a parallel machines as this reduces 
latency delays in networks and all the processors are binary compatible. 
In the next chapter we shall discuss the generation of input conditions for 
automated testing of DIVDT. 
 
 
    53
6.0 Chapter 6: Automated Test Case Generation 
 
Several papers have been published on automated test case generation for testing 
software. They are usually based on criteria like specifications [16] or data flow graphs 
[17][18]. Data flow methods usually give a comprehensive logical path coverage.  
In this thesis we develop an automated test strategy for testing the Trajectory 
Evaluation Stage (DIVDT) of DOLILU II system. DIVDT does the evaluation by 
exercising one function per rule to determine if the input files are indeed valid flight 
trajectories. Conceptually, there are only two types of execution: 
 Either an incorrect data in any of the input files terminates the evaluation process and 
DIVDT displays an appropriate message, or  
 The evaluation of all the rules is successfully completed. 
To automate generation of test cases, we need to generate input conditions. Even 
though our primary aim was to test DIVDT, we could not simulate the required trajectory 
files generated by DADS and SVDS (If we could simulate it then we could replace the 
functionality of DADS and SVDS!!). Hence we needed to generate inputs to the system, 
namely atmospheric conditions. 
6.1 Basic Philosophy 
 
The idea behind this methodology is simple. We first analyze the data (the 
observations) and then attempt to fit models to predict/interpolate data. In order to 
achieve this we needed to first establish interactions between the factors that comprise the 
system. We chose one of the factors to be the independent variable and determine others 
based on changes to this variable. 
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The algorithm is as follows 
 Assimilate data 
 By the rule of the thumb, chose 80% of the data to fit the model and the remaining 
20% to evaluate the model. 
 Determine first, the possibility of liner relationships between factors, considering two 
factors at a time and then three (line on plane). 
 Remove any outliers that might exist. These produce erroneous models. 
 Fit models, first starting with linear models. We should get a fairly good idea in 
previously mentioned step  about linearity between factors. 
 Determine goodness fit for the model chosen 
 Fit “mutators”; mutators change the independent variable and then predict other 
values based on this change to simulate a new input suite. 
In our model we have four factors of interest, namely, pressure, temperature, wind 
and direction of wind. We chose pressure as the independent variable as it had a near 
linear relationship with altitude for the first 2km of the atmosphere and later on a near 
exponential curve. We then establish the models to predict temperature and wind speeds 
based on changes in pressure. 
6.2 Regression Models, Surface Models Analysis 
 
We applied regression methods for establishing predictor functions between the 
various factors. In this section we will introduce regression models that we analyzed and 
applied to automate generation of test cases. We first analyze linear models, both one 
factor and multiple factor parameters and then address models that fit polynomial curves, 
and log linear curves for the data. 
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6.2.1 Linear Regression models 
 Regression is a statistical methodology that determines the relationship between 
two or more factors and utilizes it to predict one from the others. When we address 
relationships there are two types that generally come to mind: a pure functional 
relationship and statistical relationship. The two differ in their models and predictions. 
Functional relationships define precise mathematical formulae between two or more 
factors. The observations for functional relationship all fall on the curve. Statistical 
models on the other hand are not perfect. Statistical models determine best-fit curves for 
the data observed and hence observations do not fall directly on the curve. This is made 
clear from graphs given below. Figure 6.1 shows a perfect linear fit depicting functional  
Figure 6.1: Functional Relationship f(y) = 1.5x 
 
relationship that exists. Consider the statistical model fit in the graph shown in Figure 
6.2. It is clear that the fit model is not linear. However regression models are statistical 
guesses as to the best-fit possible for the given data. Clearly, a linear fit does not 
accommodate the data given. Further on in this chapter we shall discuss transformation 
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Regression Plot
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Figure 6.2: Regression Plot f(y) = 0.1342x + 20.84 
 
The linear regression model is given by 
   21 ββ += ii xy           (6.1) 
The parameters β1 and β2 are called the regression coefficients. β1 is the slope of the 
regression line. It indicates the change in the mean of the probability distribution of y per 
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Figure 6.3: Simple Linear Regression Model 
 
unit increase in x. β2 is the y-intercept of the regression line. We know that regression 
models do have errors in their prediction. Errors are assumed normally distributed around 
the predicted point. The bell shaped curves at every value of y show this in the diagram. 
The mean value of this distribution (the expected value) is our predicted value. Hence, we 
E[y] = 2.1x 
εi 
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talk about the “mean probability distribution” of y. The equation of a linear model with 
errors is 
    iii xy εββ ++= 21      …(6.2) 
The alternative model is to use the predictor variable deviation XX i − rather than Xi. To 
leave the model unchanged we alter equation (6.2) as follows 
    imeanmeanii xxxy εβββ +++−= 211 )(   …(6.3) 
This can be reduced to 
    imeanii xxy εββ ++−=
*
01 )(     …(6.4) 
where β0* = β1xmean + β2. 
6.2.2 Estimation of the Regression Model 
The observational data used for predicting the parameters in a regression function 
consists of observations on the predictor variable X and the corresponding observations of 
the response variable Y. In general, we group each trial as a pair (Xi , Yi), where i denotes 
the trial number. There are two main methods for estimation 
 Method of Least Squares. 
 Method of Maximum Likelihood. 
6.2.2.1 Method of Least Squares 
 
To find “good” estimates for β1 and β2, we employ the method of least squares. 
Method of least squares is based on minimizing the error between the estimated value for 
the response variable and the actual value for the response variable. In essence, method of 
least squares requires that the sum of squared deviation be minimum. The criterion may 
be mathematically formulated as 
 









21 )]([( ββ      …(6.5) 
We need to determine the values of β1 and β2 for which the fitted regression 
model would have minimum errors in the estimates. We determine the values β1=b1 and 
β2 = b2 for which the criterion is satisfied. The values are derived by partially 
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Equating equations (6.6) and (6.7) to zero for minimization we get 
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 −= ∑∑                  (6.11) 
6.2.2.2 Method of Maximum Likelihood 
No matter what may be the form of the distribution of the error terms εi, the least 
squares method provides unbiased estimators of β0 and β1 that have minimum variance 
among all unbiased linear estimators. The normal error regression  model is as follows: 
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Yi = β0 +β1 Xi+εi              ….(6.12) 
Where: 
Yi is the observed response in the ith trial, 
β0  and β1 are parameters, 
Xi  is a known constant, the level of the predictor variable in the  ith trial, 
εi are independent N(0,σ2), 
i = 1……, n. 
The regression model implies that the Yi are independent normal random 
variables, with mean E (Yi) = β0 +β1 Xi and variance σ2. The normality assumption for the 
error terms is justifiable in many situations because the error terms frequently represent 
the effects of factors omitted from the model that effect the response to some extent and 
vary at random without reference to the variable X. When the functional form of the 
probability distribution of the error terms is specified, estimators of the parameters β0 , β1  
and σ2 can be obtained by the method of maximum likelihood. 
Essentially, the method of maximum likelihood chooses as estimates those values 
of the parameters that are most consistent with the sample data. The concepts presented 
for maximum likelihood estimation of a population mean carry over directly to the 
estimation of the parameters of normal error regression model.  For this model, each Yi 
observation is normally distributed with mean β0 +β1 Xi and standard deviation σ. 
In general, the density of a function YI for the normal error regression model is as 
follows utilizing the fact that E (Yi) = β0 +β1 Xi and σ2(Yi) = σ2: 
 
 


























Yf      (6.13) 
The likelihood function for n observations Y1, Y2… ,Yn is the product of the 
individual densities.  Since the variance σ2 of the error terms is usually unknown, the 



















σββ                (6.14) 
 



















σββ               (6.15) 
The values of β0, β1, and σ2 that maximize this likelihood function are the 
maximum likelihood estimators and are denoted by 0β̂ , 1̂β  and 
2σ̂  respectively.  These 
estimators can be found analytically, and they are as follows: 
 
Parameter Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
β0 0β̂ = b0 
β1 
1̂β = b1 
σ2 2σ̂ = Σ(Yi - iY )         1..n 
 
Thus the maximum likelihood parameters of β0 and β1 are the same estimators as 
provided by the method of least squares.  Here maximum likelihood estimator 2σ̂ is 
biased, and ordinarily the unbiased estimator MSE is used.  Note that the unbiased 
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nMSE       (6.16) 
6.2.3 Multiple Regression Models – Surface Models 
Every so often the linear regression model may not suffice to delineate the nature 
of the data that one is trying to model. The reason is two-fold, 
 Either the response variable in the model does not relate to only one parameter but 
may be dependent on several factors in reality. 
 There is also the plausible causality between two or more predictor variables. These 
are termed statistically as interactions between the factors. 
When scenarios like these arise, we adopt multiple linear regression models also 
called surface models (the reason being that the fitted regression model forms a surface in 
the n-dimensional space). In general, we term all models as multiple linear regression 
models even if they contain quadratic factors or exponential terms. This is made clear 
further on in this chapter. 
We may represent the multiple regression model as 
iipipiiii XXXXY εβββββ ++++++= .............3322110     (6.17) 
where  
YI is the predicted variable, 
Xi1 – Xip:  are the predictor variables, 
β1 - β2 are the regression coefficients. 
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In order to simplify the explanation let us consider the case of bivariate 
regression. In this case Yi is dependent on two variables represented as Xi1 and Xi2. The 
regression model takes the form 
   iiii XXY εβββ +++= 22110        (6.18) 
Here the coefficients β1 and β2 represent the variability of Xi1 and Xi2 with 
changes in Yi. In other words the β1 denote the per unit change in the value Yi for a small 
change in the value of Xi1 provided Xi2 is held constant. The vice versa is the definition 
for β2. εii represents the error in the estimate for Yi.  
6.2.3.1 Estimating variability and multiple correlation coefficient  
 
We define the multiple regression correlation coefficient R2 as a measure of the 
prediction of Y obtained from the regression equation. If Y is perfectly predicted then R2 = 
1. If the multiple regression equation predicts no better than the equation YY = , then R2 
= 0. The proportion of the variability of Y accounted for by regression on p predictor 
variables is given by 





R =2 ....12.        (6.19) 
where SSreg = 2)ˆ( YYi∑ − is the amount of variability in Y accounted by regression. 
The variability of Y defined as SSy is partitioned into two main parts SSreg and 
SSerror. The first is the variability by regression alone and the second is the error or 
residuals. SSreg for multiple regression with p predictor variables with completely 
uncorrelated variables leads to non-overlapping error components associated with each of 
the predictors. Hence the total variability is the sum of individual variability for each 
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predictor variable. However, if the variables are correlated then we need the regression 
coefficient to be adjusted to reflect the true variability and goodness fit estimate. For our 
purposes to determine adjusted R2 we use 












adj       (6.20) 
where N is the sampled population size and p is the number of predictor variables 
6.2.3.2 Estimation of the regression coefficients 
 
We may represent the regression equation in matrix terms as follows (assuming 



































































































    (6.21) 
This forms a set of linear equations that needs to be solved to determine the regression 
coefficients.  The equation may be represented as  
ε+= BXY        (6.22) 
Let X’ represent the transpose of matrix X. Similarly β’ and Y’ represent the respective 
matrix transposes for β and Y. Therefore we have  
[ ]nYYYYY .' 321=       (6.23) 
[ ]321' ββββ =        (6.24) 
and X’ as 
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'      (6.25) 
We can then determine the coefficient matrix β to be given by  
    YXXX ')'( 1−=β        (6.26) 
The various statistics are then given by 
  2'' YnYXESS −= β        (6.27) 
    2' YnYYTSS −=        (6.28) 
  
TSS
ESSR =2         (6.29) 

















knRRadj       (6.31) 
where n is the number of observations and k is the number of variables involved in the 
regression equation. The value of R2 approaching 1 shows a very good fit for the data. To 
formally verify the goodness fit we determine the equivalent F-statistic. A high value for 
the F-statistic is indicative of a good fit and a low value closer to 1 is indicative of a bad 
regression fit for prediction. 
6.3 Selecting  the Best Regression Equation for Prediction 
 
Sometimes the criterion of interest is predicted by developing a regression 
equation containing a subset of the potentially useful predictor variables that are 
available.  A number of automated procedures have been developed to produce the best 
possible predictions with regression equations that contain relatively few predictors. 
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These procedures include  
 Forward selection 
 Backward elimination 
 Stepwise regression. 
With these procedures it is often possible to select a subset of the potential predictors 
that accounts for nearly as large a proportion of the variability in Y as does the entire 
pool of predictors. 
6.3.1 Forward Selection 
In this procedure, one variable at a time is used to build the regression equation.  
Initially the predictor with the highest correlation (positive or negative) is selected.  If it 
fails to meet the criterion for inclusion, the procedure ends with no predictors in the 
equation, and the final equation is 
YYi =       ..(6.32) 
If the first predictor meets the criterion, on the next step a second predictor is 
selected and tested to determine whether it should be entered into the equation.  The 
predictor selected is the one that would result in the greatest increment in R2 if added to 
the equation.  If the second predictor does not meet the criterion for inclusion, the 
procedure terminates with only a single predictor in the equation.  If it does meet the 
criterion, on the third step, a third predictor is selected and tested, and so on.  At each 
step, a partial F test is performed on the selected variable, and the criterion for inclusion 
is stated in terms of the critical value or the significance level of the F.  In forward 
selection and stepwise regression, a liberal criterion for entering variables into the 
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equation is often employed.  This will generally allow the investigation of more variables 
than would normally be used, so that a number of possible equations can be considered. 
It should be noted that for procedures like forward selection, the usual 
significance levels obtained from the F distribution are not appropriate.  This is because 
at each step a number of possible predictors are examined and only one- the one that 
produces the greatest increment in R2 or, equivalently, the one that has the largest partial 
F- is tested.  If only a single predictor variable is to be chosen from a pool of m possible 
predictors, the situation is analogous to choosing the largest member of a family of m 
contrasts and testing it for significance. 
6.3.2 Backward Elimination 
Backward elimination begins with all the predictors in the equation and removes 
them one by one until the final equation is obtained.  At each step, the predictor in the 
equation that produces the smallest increment in R2 is tested to determine whether it 
should be removed from the equation.  Again the criterion for removal is generally stated 
in terms of the significance level of a partial F test. If the selected variable is removed, 
another predictor is selected and tested on the next step.  The procedure terminates when 
a predictor that has been selected for testing is not removed from the equation; it and all 
other predictors remaining in the equation are included in the final regression equation. 
6.3.3 Stepwise Regression 
Stepwise regression is a combination of forward selection and backward 
elimination.  The procedure is essentially the same as the forward selection with the 
exception that after each new predictor has been added to the regression equation, all the 
predictors already in the equation are reexamined to determine whether they should be 
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removed.  A partial F test is performed on the predictor already in the equation that 
produces the smallest increment in R2.  If the predictor no longer satisfies the criteria for 
inclusion, it is removed from the equation.  Statistical packages allow the user to set the 
significance levels for entering or removing a variable.  The F for entering the variables 
into the equation should be set at least as high as the F for removing them.  Otherwise, 
variables may be cycled in and out of the equation. 
It is not difficult to see why it is sometimes desirable to remove a predictor that 
had been entered early in the analysis.  For example, suppose that X5 is highly predictable 
from X4 and X9 but is more highly correlated with Y than either of them. Even though X5 
may enter the equation early because of its high correlation with Y, it will become 
superfluous after X4 and X9 are entered.  That is even if X5 contributes significantly to the 
predictability of Y by itself, it may not make a significant contribution over and above the 
predictability provided by the other two variables. 
Again it is important to emphasize that when predictor variables entered into the 
equation are selected from a larger pool, the significance levels printed out by stepwise 
programs are not ‘real’ p values.  Because many practitioners seem to be unaware of this 
fact, stepwise regression outputs are often misinterpreted. 
Finally we again emphasize that the sole motivation for the automated procedures 
described in this section is to develop useful prediction equations that include subsets of 
the available variables. 
6.4 Development of Model 
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We needed to develop vertical atmospheric profiles for wind, temperature and 
pressure. As outlined earlier on in this chapter our first stage in this process is to analyze 
the data. We first determine the variations of temperature, pressure and wind with 
increasing altitude. We plotted graphs to determine the variation. Figure 6.4-6.6 shows 
the individual variations of temperature, pressure and wind with height. 
      Figure 6.4 Graph showing variation in temperature with altitude 
 
    
Figure 6.5 Variation of Pressure with Altitude 
 
The graph for pressure (Figure 6.5) shows the greatest linearity with altitude. 
Hence we choose pressure as the independent variable and expressed all other parameters 











































    69
changes with altitude and then determine the corresponding values of temperature and 
wind based on generated values of pressure. We fit normal or Gaussian mutators to 
generate different but close values around the mean value of pressure in a given day at 
the ground level. The purpose of mutations is to generate a new set of test trajectories. 
We then predict the value sets as described above. 
         Figure 6.6 Variation of Wind Speed with Altitude 
 
6.4.1 Pressure Model 
The following fitted models presented in this section provide prediction for a 
single day, the chosen day is 28th May 1996. The subsections explain how we fit a model 
for predicting pressure, temperature and wind conditions.  
We first ran a correlation between pressure and altitude. We obtained the index as 
CORRpres,wind = -0.99923.  This is indicative of a possibly high probability of linearity 
between the two factors. Hence we choose a linear regression function to predict pressure 
based on altitude. The fitted regression equation may be represented as  
    11 )( caltbpressure +=     ..(6.33) 
Solving we get b1 = -0.09795 and c1 = 969.2212. Hence the equation is  
    2212.969)(09795.0 +−= altpressure   ..(6.34) 
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In order to test to goodness fit we determine the correlation regression coefficient 
and the F-statistic, the values found were R2 = 0.999 and F-stat = 124860. Both these 
values indicate a very good regression fit between the predicted (dependent) and 
predictor (independent) variables.  
6.4.2 Temperature Model 
 To determine temperature variation with altitude, we ran a correlation with 
pressure and altitude.  The respective correlation coefficients obtained were CORRtemp,press 
= 0.95 and with altitude CORRtemp, alt = -0.9574. We shall now adopt a forward regression 
methodology. Develop a model with only altitude as a parameter. The correlation 
regression coefficient R2 = 0.9164. This is a good fit but we decided to introduce pressure 
in the equation too and find out if there is an improvement in prediction. Now the 
regression coefficient improved to R2 = 0.9448. This is a significant improvement over 
the previous prediction.  
We investigated whether temperature varies linearly with a transformed variable 
(like either log(alt) or (alt)2). In fact the temperature had a better correlation with alt2. We 
now did stepwise regression. We needed to determine if all the factors contributed 
towards the prediction. When adopting the stepwise regression methodology we 
determined that the combined contribution of pressure and height is better in predicting 
the temperature than alt2. The equation is 
   5906.225)(02547.0)(21257.0 +−−= altpressuretemp  ..(6.35) 
The fitted regression plot function visualized as a surface forms a plane in the 3-D space. 
This is as shown in the figure below 
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Figure 6.6: Surface Plot of Temperature with Pressure and Altitude 
 
6.4.3 Wind Model 
The challenge was to model wind values in terms of altitude, pressure and 
temperature. Wind’s vicissitudes in values needed some form of transformation to be 
applied to the predictor and response values to try and conform it to as near linearity as 
possible. We adopted certain standard transformations like log, exponential, square root 
and others. There was a great degree of randomness in the values for wind. Stepwise 
regression was then performed. The fitted regression equation was 
)log(*3876)Pr/1(*2045765)log(*2121.20383 pressureessuretempwind −−+= .(6.36) 
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6.5 Generating Values 
 
There are two approaches for developing models for predicting atmospheric 
conditions. One model is to develop atmospheric conditions similar to mean monthly 
wind and pressure. The second model is to have a new model generated for each day and 
predict for that particular day. Since the DOLILU II system required to have near real 
time situations to test, and as mean monthly atmospheric conditions do not capture the 
nuances in atmospheric conditions on a particular day, we decided on having a separate 
model for each day. 
Having predicted the equations in the preceding subsections we shall now 
generate input conditions to form different test suites. One major advantage with the 
second approach is we generate closely related input trajectory parameters, which helps 
us in creating an oracle that unambiguously decides on the output generated.  
We now fit a mutator, say a normal mutator, that randomly generates pressure 
values in range at the ground level.  We then generate the corresponding values of for 
pressure, wind, and temperature based on the values generated.  
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7.0 Chapter 7.0: Conclusions and Further Work 
 
In this thesis we have attempted to address three primary issues involved when 
assessing software,  
 A framework of assessment. We used a Bayesian framework to incorporate our 
knowledge of the system into our assessment model. We needed to determine how we 
could assign priors to reflect the belief in our system. We investigated and determined 
that we may assign values for p, q based on mean probability of failure and the 
tolerance for variance. 
 Enhancing the speed for test execution. Apart from vertical slicing, we attempted at 
alternative schemes for enhancing speed for execution. Monotonic transformations 
like changing numerical precision could enhance the speed. But we couldn’t 
incorporate these changes permanently to the software. If we needed to do so, we 
required an oracle that decides whether the output was incorrect. With an occurrence 
of an error the oracle then runs original program segment to determine the correct 
output. 
 Automated generation of test cases. 
The first two address the economic feasibility for testing software, especially high 
assurance software. The last issue deals with automating generation of test cases for 
ensuring the reliability of the software when there is scarcity of previous data. 
We developed a statistical framework for assessing software reliability of a high 
assurance system DOLILU II. We used a Bayesian Inference Framework, primarily 
because of the use of subjective prior knowledge in the reliability assessment model. 
Bayesian methods not only provide better interpretation of test results but also achieve it 
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with fewer test executions. A comparison between Random Sampling and Bayesian 
methodologies clearly shows a superior framework for assessment when using Bayesian 
Statistics. 
 One of the important areas for further research would be how to translate different 
methodologies of quality assurance into prior beliefs for the software? For Example if the 
specification for the software was extensively exercised, how could this translate into a 
belief within the assessment model. How could bayesian statistics support analysis in an 
earlier stage in the software lifecycle? 
 It is clear that no single assessment method is capable of an accurate prediction of 
software quality. We could further research into marrying different methods like formal 
verification, testing coupled with bayesian framework to achieve a better framework 
which assesses high assurance software economically, and in a reasonable time frame. 
 We also discussed methods for enhancing the speed for each test execution. We 
focused primarily on program slices (semantic transformation), that are partial programs, 
which are capable of executing independently. The union of all the outputs produced by 
the individual slices forms the output of the original program.  We also suggested 
changes for numerically intensive slices to further enhance the speed.  
Research could be directed on how we may achieve this. We need to research into 
applicability of the transformation with their criterion of inclusion, in other words what 
should be an acceptable degree of latitude one may give to these transformed 
computations so that they would not adversely affect the output. Research could be done 
also in predicting the change in the output for the proposed changes. 
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One aspect that wasn’t addressed in this thesis is generation of a test oracle. An 
oracle unambiguously decides whether a given output is correct or incorrect. For 
DOLILU II system the generated outputs for any two input trajectories are expected to be 
close for near similar input conditions. An oracle could simply decide on an erroneous 
output by determining the difference in the two simulated outputs for closely related 
inputs. Research can be done further on generating an automated oracle on the 
aforementioned premise. One has to decide what statistical distance would qualify to 
define the degree of closeness for the inputs and the outputs. 
There are ample opportunities were we could apply a different approach for 
assessing. We could also look into genetic algorithms, which may be used to generate test 
suites for a program. Genetic algorithms are learning based algorithms, which continually 
enrich themselves. We could research into the applicability of these algorithms for test 
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We adopted a tabular form of representation for ease of explanation. Consider 
table A.2, which provides the proof for the evaluation of rule S1 (pitch and yaw I-load 
with Sail envelopes). The format is as follows, each procedure call forms a separate row 
in the table. The keyword procedure and a descriptive name delineating the purpose of 
the procedure precede them. Variables declared locally within the procedure are defined 
in the row immediately following the procedure.  Variables indicated as global are either 
defined as common in FORTRAN (or passed by reference in C) to the function. 
When DIVDT is invoked the first procedure executed is to set up input files for 
DIVDT’s proper functioning. If any of the input files are missing, DIVDT terminates the 
evaluation process and an appropriate message is displayed or logged in a file. This 
procedure is shown in row 1 of table A.2.  
The next procedure called checks for the format of the input trajectory and limit 
files. In order to maintain consistency in representing data for trajectories and input files, 
NASA adopted a standard method of representation. If any of the files deviate from their 
expected format or if there are missing values or an incorrect data type (e.g. a float value 
is expected in the file but textual string is found) DIVDT terminates the evaluation 
process and logs the error in a file. The file contains information on where the error 
occurred, the filename and the line at which the error occurred, the type of error that 
caused the termination. This is procedure in row 2 in table A.2. 
The third row in table A.2 indicates reading in the input limits for each individual 
rule.  Although the limits for all the rules are read in, when vertically slicing only 
variables that affect the evaluation of a specific rule are required. These variables are 
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indicated in the succeeding row. Allocations are done on the heap so that the values may 
be passed on to evaluation procedure. 
Rows 5 through 15 are executed in a loop. This is shown alongside the table with 
an arrow starting at row 15 and ending in row 5. This loop terminates with the end of the 
trajectory files. Trajectory files are large and cannot be stored in memory. Hence DIVDT 
loops through each point in the trajectory file. Every point in the trajectory file is stored 
in specified format referred to as a record. Every record in the file is preceded by a 
textual line, indicating which record type to use based on which stage (first stage, pre-
orbital insertion or orbiting stage) in the flight trajectory is the evaluation taking place. 
The record names used are 
 STDRCD:- this indicates the standard record format for the first stage conditions in 
the trajectory. 
 SRBSTD:- indicates the standard record format for pre-orbital insertion stage in the 
trajectory. 
 MECSTD:- indicates the standard record format for the orbiting stage. 
 SRBSUP:- this is a supplementary record format required for certain rules during pre-
orbital insertion stage. 
 MECSUP:- supplementary record format required for certain rule evaluations during 
the orbiting stage. 
Each record is an array and follows a common naming convention. Record names 
are of one of the following types STDRCD_XXX, SRBSTD_XXX, MECSTD_XXX, 
SRBSUP_XXX and MECSUP_XXX. Here _XXX = DOLIT to indicate SVDS simulated 
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trajectory for day-of-launch conditions, or _XXX = DADS to indicate DADS simulated 
trajectory or _XXX = REFT indicating reference trajectory. 
Row 5 in table A.2, refers to the procedure call that reads in SVDS trajectory 
record into the appropriate array, followed by DADS trajectory record (row 7 in table 
A.2) and finally Reference trajectory record (row 9 in table A.2). 
Row 12 calls procedure read DADS I-Loads (guidance commands) which reads 
the corresponding DADS I-Loads from the dads_iloads file into ILRECD array. 
Row 14 in table A.2 calls procedure evaluate ruleS1. This procedure evaluates the 
rule for the given point in the trajectory. It stores percentage exceedance and the 
reference values. Once the evaluation is completed for all points in the trajectory, the data 
is stored in files (ASCII for textual files like detailed summary and binary for plot files). 
Row 16 in table A.2 calls DIVDTPLT to generate the plot files. 
We can repeat the same procedure for the other rules. 
 
Table A.2 Rule S1 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 






5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




12 Procedure Read DADS_Iloads 
13 ILRECD[200] 
14 Procedure Evaluate RuleS1 
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15 PSI_ACTUAL , PEREXCEEDANCE [90] (global), REFVALUES[90](global) 
THET_ACTUAL,  
RESULT[90](global) 
16 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
Table A.3 Rule S2 
1 Procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read_Input_File_Limits 
4 QBR_LIM 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




12 Procedure Evaluate_RuleS2 
13 QBAR_ACTUAL , PERCENTEXCEEDANCE[90], REFVALUES[90] 
RESULT[90] 
14 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.4: Rule S3 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read_Input_File_Limits 
4 ALD_LIM_LOW 
ALD_LIM_HI 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS3 
12 ALD_ACTUAL (iterative process evaluating the rule for each record in the i/p traj.) 
RESULT  






Table A.5: Rule S4 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Read Limits RuleS4 
4 BED_LIM_LOW 
BED_LIM_HI 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Evaluate RuleS4 
12 BED_ACTUAL (iterative process evaluating the rule for each record in the input trajectory) 
RESULT 




Table A.6: Rule S5 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 







5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS5 










Table A.7: Rule S6 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS6 
4 DELTA_WIND_MARGIN 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS6 
12 Wind_Margin 
RESULT 
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.8: Rule S7 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 




5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 











13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
Table A.9: Rule S8 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS8 (VENTDATA) 
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4 NMCH (number of Mach Values) 
MACH (MACH number) 
NBET (number of Batches) 
PTS (number of Points) 
CALD (Center Altitude) 
CBAR (Center Pressure) 
ALD (Altitude Coords.) 
QBAR (Pressure) 
DALD (Delta Altitude (change)) 
DBAR (Change in Pressure) 
 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 








16 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.10: Rule S9 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS9 
4 ARRAY_SIZE 
MACH_REF[50] (Mach Reference) 
MIN_ALPHA_5[50]        
MIN_BETA_5[50] 
MAX_DENSITY_1[50] 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS9 
12 RESULT 




Table A.11: Rule S13 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 






5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS13 
12 QPOLY_3_SIGMA 
RESULT 
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.12: Rule S14 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS14 










5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 













13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
Table A.13: Rule S15 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS15 
4 WTZMAR 
MARGIN_LIM 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS15 
12 WEIGHT_MARGIN 
RESULT 
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.14: Rule S16 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 








5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 











13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
Table A.15: Rule S19 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 







5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Read DADS_Iloads 
12 ILRECD[200] 




15 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
Table A.16: Rule S20 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS20 
4 TREF_LIM_HI 
TREF_LIM_LOW 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 









13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
Table A.17: Rule S21 
1 Procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 






































5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 








13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.18: Rule S22 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleS22 
4 TDEL_LIM 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 






11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS22 
12 RESULT 
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.19: Rule S23 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 










5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 









13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.21: Rule S24 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 





5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleS24 
12 RESULT 




Table A.22: Rule E1 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE1 
4 GAMMA_STG_LIM_MAX 
GAMMA_STG_LIM_MIN 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE1 
12 GAMMA_STG 
RESULT 
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.23: Rule E2 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE2 
4 ALT_STG_LIM_MAX 
ALT_STG_LIM_MAX 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE2 
12 ALT_STG 
RESULT 
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
Table A.24: Rule E3 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE3 
4 MAX_DEL_AZI 
MIN_DEL_AZI 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 
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7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE3 
12 AZIMUTH_STG 
RESULT 
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.25: Rule E4 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 









5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 









13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.26: Rule E5 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 











5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 









13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.27: Rule E6 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 









5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 













Table A.27: Rule E7 
1 Procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 








5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 









13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
Table A.27: Rule E8 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 





















5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 










13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.28: Rule E9 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 










5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE9 
12 RESULT 
13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.29: Rule E10 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 









5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Read DADS_Iloads 
12 ILRECD[200] 







15 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.30: Rule E11 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 






5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 










13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.31: Rule E14 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE14 
4 VREL_LIM_HI 
VREL_LIM_LOW 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 








13 Procedure DIVDTPLT 
 
 
Table A.32: Rule E15 
1 procedure SETUP_INPUT_FILES 
2 Procedure CHECK_UNIT15 (format for all files) 
3 Procedure Read Limits RuleE11 
4 HDOT_STG_LIM_HI 
HDOT_STG_LIM_LOW 
5 Procedure Process_DOLITRAJ (read in record) 




7 Procedure Process_DADSTRAJ (read in record) 




9 Procedure Process_REFTRAJ (read in record) 




11 Procedure Evaluate RuleE15 
12 ALT_RATE 
RESULT 








B.1 Solve Integration by Parts 
 
 Integration by parts may be done according to the following formula 
   ( )∫ ∫ ∫ ∫−== dudvdvuudvI .          (B.1) 
This implies  
   ∫−= vduuvI .            (B.2) 
We may represent the equation in another form  







duvdxvdxuuvdxI .        (B.3) 
Consider the generalized complete beta function given by 




11 )1(),( .        (B.4) 
We have a>0 and b>0, assuming only integer values for a, b we shall now repeatedly 
integrate equation (B.4) using (B.3). Let I denote the final integration result, therefore 




11 )1(),( .       (B.5) 
According to equation (B.3) we have  
























111 )1()1( .    (B.6) 
Therefore, applying the limits [0,1], we get 















This evaluates to  








2 )1()1()00(1 .     (B.8) 
Therefore  









.        (B.9) 
Let I1 denote 





1 )1(  .      (B.10) 
I  now become 
   1
)1( I
b
aI −=         (B.11) 
Using equation (B.3) again to evaluate I1 we get 

























1 )1()1( .   (B.12) 
Therefore applying limits [0,1] we get I1 to be 

















−= ∫ .  (B.13) 
This implies 


















1    (B.14) 












     (B.15) 
Let I2 denote the integration in equation (B.15). Therefore I1 is 
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=        (B.16) 
This is clearly seen to be recursive (observe equations (B.16) and (B.11)). In general  




iaI        (B.17) 
where Ii+1 denotes 






1 )1(      (B.18) 
This continues till the power of θ a-1 becomes 0. Therefore 





aaI       (B.19) 






1 )1(      (B.20) 
Solving for Ia-1, we get 






1 )1(       (B.21) 




I θ      (B.22) 









I a .     (B.23) 
Substituting for Ia-1 in equation (B.19) we get 







I a      (B.24) 
Therefore I would be equal to 




















aI .    (B.25) 
 
 102 
If we take a=p and b=q+U  then we  






















pUqpB  (B.27) 
 
Table B.1: priors for corresponding belief in θ 
Value of θ Value p Value q 
10-2 5 990 
10-3 8 9850 
10-4 10 99800 
10-5 100 4510488 
10-6 120 1997988 




B.2 Priors based on µ and σ2 for beta distribution 
 
 We know that the mean and variance for beta distribution is given by  




=µ       (B.28) 






pqσ      (B.29) 
 
We believe that the system has exhibited a mean µ = 10-5. It is required that the variance 
be very less to instill better confidence in our belief. Let us assume that the variance be 
atleast 10-10. We shall now derive p and q in terms for the mean and variance. 
 Using equation (B.28), we get 




    qp µµ =− )1( .      (B.31) 
Therefore 




= qp .       (B.32) 
Now we have variance given by equation (B.29). Using (B.29), we get 
   2
2 )1()(
σ
pqqpqp =+++ .      (B.33) 
This implies 
   2
22 )1)(2(
σ
pqqpqpqp =++++ .     (B.34) 
Therefore 
 
   2
22322223 222
σ
pqqpqpqpqqppqqpp =++++++++ .  (B.35) 
Rearranging and combining terms we have 
   2
222233 233
σ
pqpqpqqpqpqp =++++++ .   (B.36) 

















































































qqqq .  (B.38) 











































µ q .  (B.39) 
 
 104 



























































q .     (B.41) 
Therefore 



































































q .    (B.42) 
Simplifying, we get 




µµ −−−=q .      (B.43) 
Taking σ2 = 10-10, and µ = 10-5, we get 
   q = 10-5 x 1010 x (1-0.00001)2 - (1-0.00001)    (B.44) 
Approximating to the nearest integer  
   q  =  99997 
Therefore p will be 
   p =  10-5 x  99997 / 0.99999 = 1 
If we take σ2 = 10-15, we get q = 9999800000 and p =  99998. 
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Table B.2 Variation in tests with decreasing variance, confidence = 0.99, θ = 10-4 
VarVariance P q tests 
2x10-9 5 49995 13691
1.25x10-9 8 79992 24277
4x10-10 25 249975 67597
1.6x10-10 60 599940 126773
1.4x10-10 70 699930 140632
 
 
   Figure B.4 Showing Variation of no. of test for θ =10-4, C=0.99  
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